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In this paper, we use disaggregated data on regional trade in China to assess the channels through
which the country's exports have surged. As a starting point for our analysis, we use a Bartik
(1991) shift-share approach to evaluate the common component of industry-level export growth
across regions in China. If regional comparative advantage or industry agglomeration patterns are
roughly stable over decadal time periods, then export growth across regions will vary according to
their initial patterns of industrial specialization and which industries enjoyed rapid export growth
at the national level. We also consider the impact of explicit measures of policy change that the
literature has identiﬁed as drivers of China's trade expansion, including reductions of tariﬀs on
ﬁnal goods, tariﬀs on imported intermediate inputs, trade-policy uncertainty for China in the U.S.
market, and MFA quotas on apparel and textile products. We ﬁnd that a simple Bartik measure has
substantial predictive power for China's regional export growth. Once we add the Bartik measure to
the analysis, the impacts of reduced input and output tariﬀs or trade-policy uncertainty on China's
export growth fall substantially and become statistically insigniﬁcant. These tariﬀ-based predictors
of export growth are also very sensitive to the inclusion of time trends across provinces and broad
sectors, whereas the Bartik measure has considerably more success in predicting variation in export
growth within provinces and sectors. There is little evidence that regions more exposed to the
elimination of MFA quotas enjoyed faster export growth.
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1 Introduction
Over the last quarter century, China has emerged as the world's most dynamic manufacturing nation.
Based on data from the World Development Indicators, between 1991 and 2013 the country's share of
global manufacturing value added grew more than six fold, rising from 4% to 24%. Having surpassed
the United States in 2010, China is now the world's largest producer of manufactured goods. As
China's manufacturing sector has grown, so too has its presence in global markets. Between 1991
and 2014, China's share of world manufacturing exports increased more than seven times, from 2%
to 17%, with most of this growth having occurred by 2010, when the global ﬁnancial crisis dented
growth in world trade. Today, China is the world's factory.
Most discussions of China's manufacturing boom center on economic reforms that the country
enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, which initiated a process of export-led development similar to
that of the Asian Tigers  Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan  in earlier decades
(Rodrik, 2006; Hsieh and Ossa, 2016). Initial reforms created special economic zones in which foreign
enterprises set up export processing plants to import parts and components for the assembly of ﬁnal
exports (Wang, 2013; Alder, Shao, and Zilibotti, 2016). By the late 1990s, export-processing plants
accounted for over half of China's manufacturing exports (Yu and Tian, 2012 and 2017), with most of
this production occurring in establishments owned by multinational corporations. A second phase
of reforms closed and consolidated state-owned enterprises, allowing higher productivity private
manufacturers to expand (Hsieh and Song, 2015). At the same time, the de facto relaxation of
barriers on internal migration permitted over 150 million workers to reallocate from rural farms to
urban factories (Li, Li, Wu and Xiong, 2012; Fan, 2015; Zi, 2016).
China's outward-oriented economic-policy changes culminated with its accession to the World
Trade Organization in 2001, which reduced tariﬀ barriers on imported intermediate inputs (Yu,
2015; Amiti, Dai, Feenstra, and Romalis, 2017; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang, 2017;
Yu and Tian, 2017), phased out restrictions on which ﬁrms are allowed to export directly (Ding,
Sung, and Jiang, 2015; Bai, Krishna, and Ma, 2017), and attenuated uncertainty over China's access
to foreign markets, the United States in particular (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Handley and Limao,
2017; Erten and Leight, 2017). Together, these modiﬁcations helped China's manufacturing sector
achieve annual rates of productivity growth of nearly eight percent, on a value-added basis, and
of nearly three percent, on a gross-output basis, in the ten years preceding the onset of the global
ﬁnancial crisis (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012).
In this paper, we use disaggregated regional data on Chinese trade to assess the channels through
which the country's exports have surged. We begin the analysis by describing how the composition
of exports in China changed during the period spanning the country's accession to the WTO. Since
2000, the share of export processing in China's exports has declined, as China has shifted into more
vertically integrated forms of production for global markets. Due in large part to the liberalization
of foreign trading rights, the share of exports by state-owned enterprises has plummeted. In their
place, the share of exports by foreign-owned enterprises has grown steadily, while the share by
private domestic enterprises has skyrocketed. Also over this time period, China's exports shifted
1
from traditionally labor-intensive goods, such as apparel, footwear, furniture, and toys, to more
sophisticated electronics products, including cellphone handsets and laptop computers (Xu and Lu,
2009). Two decades ago, China had few brands that were recognized globally. Today, Huawei
(telecommunications equipment) and Lenovo (personal computers) are the largest global producers
in their respective industries, while three of the top ﬁve producers of smartphones are Chinese
companies (Huawei, Oppo, and Vivo).
As a starting point for our analysis, we use a Bartik (1991) approach to evaluate the common
component of industry-level export growth across regions in China. Applied in our context, this
approach, which takes the method in Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) for modeling the growth
in U.S. imports from China down to the level of Chinese regions, involves predicting a region's
manufacturing export growth over the 2000s by combining the initial regional share of economic
activity in each industry with national export growth in that industry and then summing across
industries. Regions are exposed to better export-growth opportunities if they begin specialized in
industries that subsequently experience rapid growth at the national level.
We thus imagine that a region's pattern of industrial specialization as of the late 1990s is pre-
dictive of its later export growth. Predictability may arise from stability in regional comparative
advantage over time (or at least over the 10-year period that we examine) or from the geographic
clustering of related industries, such that growth in one industry (textiles) tends to be related to
growth in upstream industries (chemicals) or downstream industries (apparel). Our reduced-form
empirical approach allows us to be agnostic about the origins of regional export growth. Varia-
tion in regional export growth may reﬂect regional stability in relative factor supplies (which would
determine comparative advantage in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting), in relative industry technological
capabilities (which would determine comparative advantage in a Ricardian setting), or in localiza-
tion patterns arising from agglomeration economies. Our use of a Bartik measure to explain China's
export growth is similar in spirit to Bombardini and Li (2016), who examine the consequences of
China's export boom for pollution-related mortality in the country, and Cheng and Potlogea (2015),
who study how trade-related economic linkages aﬀect local economic development in China.
Of course, regional comparative advantage or industry agglomeration are not the only factors that
indicate a region's export-growth potential. The substantial changes in China's economic policy over
the time period that we study are also potentially important determinants of regional export growth,
at least to the extent that regions diﬀer in their exposure to these policy changes. Our analysis also
considers the impact on exports of explicit measures of policy change that the literature has identiﬁed
as important drivers of China's trade expansion, in particular, and post-trade liberalization episodes,
in general. These include the reduction of barriers on imported intermediate inputs, the Pierce and
Schott (2016) measure of policy uncertainty confronting China in the U.S. market (Feng, Li, and
Swenson, 2017), and reductions in quotas on apparel and textile products mandated by the end of the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013). To avoid the confounding eﬀects of
the surge in state lending that China undertook to combat the global ﬁnancial crisis (Bai, Hsieh, and
Song, 2016), we focus our analysis on the years 2000 to 2010, which captures a period of accelerated
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export and productivity growth in China (Brandt, Wang, and Zhang, 2017) and coincides with the
most intense phase of China's export boom.
We ﬁnd that a simple Bartik measure has substantial predictive power for China's regional ex-
port growth. Even though China's regional development has been highly uneven, the spatial pattern
of regional export growth is to a large extent explained by industry trends at the national level. Our
results indicate that a region at the 75th percentile of exposure to China's national export boom
would have had growth in export intensity 0.1 standard deviations higher than a region at the 25th
percentile of exposure. Once we add the Bartik measure to the regression, the estimated impact of
reduced input tariﬀs on China's export growth falls substantially and loses statistical signiﬁcance. A
similar outcome is observed for the Pierce and Schott and Handley and Limao uncertainty measures,
whose impacts on export growth falls to zero with the inclusion of the Bartik measure. The ability of
these tariﬀ-based measures to predict export growth also declines considerably when province dum-
mies or controls for the initial specialization of cities in the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery
sectors are added to the regression analysis. Whereas exposure to diﬀerent tariﬀ regimes appears to
vary to a large extent across rather than within provinces and sectors, the Bartik measure provides a
consistently strong prediction of export growth even when province-level and sector-level trends are
absorbed into control variables. We see little evidence that regions more exposed to the elimination
of MFA quotas enjoyed faster export growth.
Next, we examine the importance of export regimes (processing versus ordinary exports) and ﬁrm
ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned, domestic privately owned establishments) in China's
export growth. If some regions  say, because of their proximity to ports  are better suited to
export processing, they may have enjoyed relatively rapid growth (Brandt and Morrow, 2017; Dai,
Maitra, and Yu, 2016). Similarly, regions that were initially more dominated by state-owned enter-
prises may have seen slower growth as foreign and private domestic ﬁrms outpaced SOEs in their
ability to attract resources and penetrate foreign markets (Hsieh and Song, 2015). We ﬁnd that
ordinary exports and processing exports operate as independent drivers of regional export growth,
while among ﬁrm types it is national growth in industry exports by foreign-owned enterprises 
rather than by state-owned or private domestic enterprises  that is the strongest predictor of re-
gional expansion in exports. The initial attractiveness of regions to foreign-owned companies, driven
in part perhaps by Deng Xiaoping's early experiments in opening locations to foreign investment
and trade  appears to have laid the foundation for China's 2000s export boom.
The result of our analysis is a reduced-form model of regional export growth in China, which can
be used to support analysis of the local-labor-market impacts of deeper global economic integration.
The rapidly growing literature on how import competition from lower-income countries has aﬀected
labor markets in developed economics (e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013 and 2016; Autor, Dorn,
Hanson, and Song, 2014; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price. 2016) has not been matched
by an equivalent volume of work on how China's export growth has aﬀected its own local labor
markets. A newly emerging literature examines how export growth in China aﬀects local pollution
(Bombardini and Li, 2016), enhances incentives for skill and capital accumulation (Cheng and Pot-
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logea, 2015; Li, 2015), and induces reallocation of labor out of agriculture and into manufacturing
(Fan, 2015; Zi, 2015; Leight, 2016; Erten and Leight, 2017). Our results provide a foundation for
the analysis of how China's export boom aﬀected China's regional economies.
2 Background on China's Export Growth
China's quarter century of export growth began in the early 1990s. Although Deng Xiaoping initiated
economic reform in the late 1970s, the early emphasis was on improving incentives for agricultural
production and relaxing centralized control over industry. In 1989, after more than a decade of
reform, China still remained a small player in global manufacturing, accounting for only 1.8% of
global manufacturing exports. When hardliners re-established control over economic policy following
the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, reform stalled and there was doubt about the sustainability
of China's transition toward a market economy (Naughton, 2007). It was not until the reformist camp
reaﬃrmed its authority over economic policy in the early 1990s that China fully embraced export-led
development. Deng's famous southern tour in 1992 focused national attention on the successes
of earlier policy experiments in a handful of locations on China's east coast (Vogel, 2011). These
eﬀorts had included the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), which allowed foreign companies
to set up export processing plants that imported inputs and exported ﬁnal outputs, relatively free
from government interference (Yu and Tian, 2017; Alder, Shao and Zilibotti, 2016). As the number
of SEZs grew from 20 in 1991 to 150 in 2010, foreign-owned export plants proliferated. According to
the World Development Indicators, inﬂows of foreign direct investment, which averaged only 0.7%
of GDP during the 1980s, rose to 4.2% of GDP during the 1990s and 2000s.
China's economic isolation under Mao created abundant opportunities for later catch up (Zhu,
2012; Brandt, Ma, and Rawski, 2016). Because the distortions of the Maoist era kept China far
inside its production frontier, market opening ignited a phase of transitional growth that was gov-
erned in large part by the country's accumulated productivity gap with the developed world (Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011). A key feature of this transitional growth was China realizing its
long dormant comparative advantage in manufacturing. Whereas many large emerging economies
specialize in primary commoditiesincluding Brazil in iron ore, Indonesia in rubber, Russia in oil
and gas, and South Africa in mineralsChina's advantage is overwhelmingly in industrial goods.
Over the period 1990 to 2013, manufacturing averaged 88% of China's total exports of goods and
services. This fraction of manufacturing exports was higher than any other country with consistent
data over this time period, and simply stunning for such a large economy. Relative to other major
emerging economies, China's manufacturing export share over this time period compares to 77%
in South Korea, 69% in Mexico, 60% in Thailand, 59% in the Philippines, 49% in India, 48% in
Vietnam, 42% in Indonesia, 41% in Brazil, 40% in South Africa, and 18% in Russia. To the extent
that China's regions varied either in their comparative advantage within manufacturing (e.g., coal
supplies in China's northeast may account for the region's strength in steel production) or their ac-
cess to foreign markets (e.g., the proximity of Guangdong province to Hong Kong may have helped
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its local ﬁrms make connections with multinational enterprises), the country's transitional growth
may have favored particular industries in particular locations. It is the combination of China's dra-
matic market opening and its latent relative strength in manufacturing production that we exploit
in specifying a Bartik-style, reduced-form model for export growth in China.
The culmination of China's entry onto the world economic stage was its accession to the WTO
in 2001. The country's entry occurred over the course of nearly a decade. In 1996, China began
to meet preconditions for its WTO accession by removing its most restrictive non-tariﬀ barriers.
Trade licenses, special import arrangements, and discriminatory policies against foreign goods were
reduced or eliminated, thereby making import tariﬀs the primary instruments of protection. In 2001,
China began to reduce tariﬀs themselves. The simple average tariﬀ (across six-digit HS products)
fell from 17% in 2000 (with a standard deviation of 12%) to 6% by the end of 2005 (with a standard
deviation that was nearly ﬁfty percent smaller). Since 2005, average tariﬀs have remained stable
(Amiti, Dai, Feenstra, and Romalis, 2017).
Changes in tariﬀs have meant increased competition from imports in China's domestic market
and improved access to imported intermediate inputs. A now substantial literature documents the
positive impact of lower barriers on imported inputs on the productivity of manufacturing plants,
including work by Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesia; Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) on India; and Yu (2015) and Brandt, Van
Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2017) on China itself. Thus, one indirect way in which the WTO
accession may have enhanced China's export performance was by raising productivity through lower-
cost access to foreign inputs and capital goods and the advanced technology that they embody.
The WTO accession also inspired other reforms. One was privatization (Berkowitz, Ma, and
Nishioka, 2017). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China idled many state-owned manufacturing
enterprises, helping the country move towards compliance with WTO provisions that restrict state
subsidies to domestic industries. Capital and labor were consequently reallocated from smaller, less
productive state-owned companies to privately owned manufacturing plants, helping raise produc-
tivity and output in the sector (Hsieh and Song, 2015). Joining the WTO also obligated China to
phase out requirements that had mandated most private establishments to export through state-run
intermediaries. Such restrictions constitute barriers to exporting, which the WTO expressly forbids.
Bai, Krishna, and Ma (2017) estimate that had private ﬁrms not been granted direct foreign trading
rights, China's manufacturing exports in the 2000s would have been one third smaller than they
were. A further consequence of China's WTO entry regards the insecurity of its access to the U.S.
market on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis. Prior to 2001, China's MFN status in the U.S.
was subject to annual reauthorization by Congress. Although Congress never failed to reauthorize
China's MFN status, the annual ritual possibly created risk in the minds of investors regarding
the stability of China's economic relations with the United States. Pierce and Schott (2016) and
Handley and Limao (2017) argue that the lurking prospect of a return to non-MFN tariﬀs, which
averaged 37.0% in 1999 and compared to average MFN tariﬀs of only 3.4% in that year, dissuaded
Chinese ﬁrms from investing in operations dedicated expressly to exporting to the United States.
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WTO accession removed this uncertainty, potentially encouraging increased trade between China
and the United States trade through this channel.
Finally, China's entry into the WTO allowed the country to beneﬁt from reduced quotas on
its exports of apparel and textile products, which WTO members had long retained alongside tar-
iﬀ reductions in other manufacturing industries under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal,
Schott, and Wei, 2013). The MFA quotas, after a staged phase out beginning in 1995, were fully
eliminated in 2005. China would have begun to enjoy the impacts of relaxed MFA quotas in 2001,
by which point two MFA quota reductions had occurred, in 1995 and 1998, and a third, in 2002, was
about to occur. As MFA quotas in China prior to 2001 appeared to be allocated disproportionately
to state-owned enterprises, their termination may have especially beneﬁted foreign and domestic
private enterprises in apparel and textile sectors.
Motivated by this context, we utilize four measures of the determinants of regional export growth
in China: (i) the reduction in tariﬀs on output and on imported intermediate inputs, (ii) the reduction
in uncertainty regarding China's access to the U.S. market, (iii) the elimination of MFA quotas,
and (iv) underlying comparative advantage. Given the importance of multinational enterprises for
China's exports, in a second stage of our analysis we evaluate export growth by ﬁrm ownership,
in which we separate foreign-owned ﬁrms from domestically owned private ﬁrms and state-owned
enterprises. The ownership distinction allows us to examine the diﬀerential performance of state-
owned ﬁrms in reaching foreign markets, after the loss of their privileged control over foreign trading
rights, MFA quotas, explicit government subsidies, and other beneﬁts.
3 Patterns of Export Production in China
In this section, we summarize the data we use in our analysis and describe patterns of export
production in China by regime, ﬁrm ownership type, sector, and region.
3.1 Data Sources
Trade data are from China's Customs Bureau, which gives details on export activity by HS 8-digit
product (of which there are roughly 7,000), customs-district (which are roughly at the prefectural
level and of which there are 742 in 2010), trade regime (discussed below and of which there are
15 in 2010), and ownership type of ﬁrm (discussed below and of which there are 7 in 2010). The
separation of exports by trade regime and ownership type, as well as by detailed product code and
regional identiﬁer, provides an enormous amount of detail on trade in China. We elect to use these
data, rather than commonly used ﬁrm-level data on trade in China, as the matching of ﬁrms to the
customs data results in a substantial loss in total trade activity. We have data for the years 1997,
2000, and 2010 and we focus the analysis on the key 2000 to 2010 period. The year 1997 is the ﬁrst
for which prefectural level trade data are available, and, as mentioned, 2000 to 2010 spans the most
intense phase of China's post-trade liberalization export growth.
To analyze regional export growth, we need to deﬁne geographic markets in China. Administra-
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tive units in the county are deﬁned at four levels: provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships.
We select the prefecture to be the target of our analysis, which leads us to aggregate more than 700
customs districts into 337 quasi-prefectural-level entities, which are roughly the equivalent of large
metropolitan zones. We refer to these entities as cities. There are three justiﬁcations for this choice.
First, people in China usually live and work within the same prefecture. (An exception to this
regularity is the four large municipalitiesBeijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjinwhich are
provinces in themselves but are generally regarded as uniﬁed local labor markets.) The prefecture
thus approximates a local labor market, which would be of interest in many applications of our
results. Combining customs districts within a prefecture into a single entity implicitly allows shocks
to one zone of a city (e.g., special economic zones in Xiamen) to aﬀect exports in other zones of
a city (e.g., locations outside SEZs in Xiamen). Second, many government policies  e.g., those
related to migration restrictions, social policy, land-use policy or infrastructure investments  are
implemented at the provincial or prefecture level. Third, most data released by China's National
Bureau of Statistics data are at the provincial or prefecture level, whereas county, township or cus-
toms area level data are limited in availability. Analysis of local labor markets in the country would
thus likely occur at the prefectural level.
3.2 Export Regimes and Ownership Types
We next describe export patterns by trading regime and ﬁrm ownership type. By far and away
the two dominant regimes are ordinary exportswhich are exports by ﬁrms that enjoy no special
beneﬁts regarding imported inputsand processing exportswhich encompass exports under in-
bond arrangements in which ﬁrms post a bond equal to the value of duties on imported inputs
and have the bond returned once they export their output, giving them tariﬀ-free access to foreign
intermediate goods under the constraint that all output is shipped abroad.
It is common for a country in the early stages of export-led growth to have processing exports
dominate its shipments to foreign markets. This was the case in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan
(Naughton, 1996), where ﬁrms entered export-oriented production by serving as assembly shops
for foreign contractors. China has followed a similar pattern. Under export processing, a foreign
ﬁrm typically provides the speciﬁcations for a product, orders or selects the inputs to be used in
production, and handles distribution, while the ﬁrm in China simply provides the labor and other
factors used to assemble or otherwise process the inputs into a ﬁnal good (Feenstra and Hanson,
2005). Often, but not always, the foreign contractor owns the Chinese export-processing plant
outright. In China's case, Hong Kong and Taiwan are the two primary economies involved in
establishing and (or) contracting with export processing plants.
Table 1 shows that processing exports as a share of total exports stood at 55% in both 1997 and
2000, and then declined over the 2000s, dropping to 47% by 2010. Brandt and Morrow (2017) argue
that the reduction in barriers on imported inputs induced many ﬁrms to reorient themselves from
being export processors to becoming ordinary exporters, so as to relax the constraint of having to
export the entirety of their output. The WTO accession thus may have encouraged China's move
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toward more vertically integrated production within manufacturing and in production by plants that
ship to foreign markets in particular.
Given the importance of multinational enterprises in export processing, it is no surprise that
foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) account for the majority of exports under this regime. Table 2
shows that in 1997, foreign-owned ﬁrms represented 64% (0.350/(0.350+0.196) of China's processing
exports, compared to their accounting for just 13% (0.061/(0.061+0.392)) of the country's ordinary
exports. The foreign-ﬁrm share of processing exports rises over time, to 71% in 2000 and to 84% in
2010. The foreign-ﬁrm share of ordinary exports also rises over time, reaching 29% by 2010.
In the 1990s, the foreign-owned ﬁrms that obtained permission to operate in China were freed
from having to export their output through state-owned intermediaries. Privately owned domestic
enterprises (POEs) could not avoid this requirement. Table 2 shows that in 1997 all processing and
ordinary exports by non-foreign ﬁrms were by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which reﬂects the
mandate still in eﬀect at this time. As the government relaxed and then eliminated the control
of foreign trading rights by state-owned ﬁrms, private domestic ﬁrms began to play a larger role
in exports. The domestic private enterprise (POE) share of ordinary exports reached 46% in 2010
(from 0% in 1997) and of processing exports reached 6% in 2010 (also from 0% in 1997). By 2010,
foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 55% of China's overall exports, followed by private domestic
ﬁrms at 27% of overall exports and state-owned ﬁrms at 18% of the total. The relative decline of the
state-owned sector in exporting is even more rapid than its decline in industrial production, which
falls from one half in 1998 to just over one quarter in 2010 (Hsieh and Song, 2015).
3.3 Measuring Export Growth and Shocks to Export Growth
In specifying regional export growth, we need to account for the fact that some prefectures begin the
sample period with relatively low levels of exports. These low export levels reﬂect the weak direct
integration of many Chinese regions into the global economy, prior to China's accession to the World
Trade Organization in 2001. Simply using the change in log exports to measure the expansion of
exports would possibly create a distorted sense of growth in these locations. The obvious solution
is to scale export growth by the size of the local economy. Because exports are a gross sales value,
the value of gross output by prefecture would be a suitable scaling variable. In China, however,
local- and industry-level output data are likely to be of low quality over our sample period. Because
city boundaries changed dramatically in the 2000s, we would need to aggregate county-level data
to construct city-level data. County-level data are likely subject to particularly severe measurement
error, and have a large number of missing values which are unlikely to be random. Absent reliable
local output data, we instead scale export growth by prefectural population at the beginning of the
sample period. China's population census provides complete county-level data for the population
based on the place of residence (rather than based on the location of one's oﬃcial registration, or
hukou status) in 1990, 2000 and 2010. Our resulting measure of regional export growth ∆xit is:
∆xit =
(
Xit −Xit−1
Xit−1
)
Xit−1
Pit−1
=
Xit −Xit−1
Pit−1
, (1)
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where Xit is exports by city i in ﬁnal year t (2010 in our analysis) and Pit−1 is the residence-based
population in city i in the initial period, t − 1 (2000 in our analysis). Table 3 presents summary
statistics. The average growth in exports per capita across Chinese regions is 1.036 (measured in
units of 1,000 US dollars, and thus corresponding to $1,036 per person), with an interquartile range
of 0.034 to 0.463, implying substantial skewness in this measure. We address skewness by presenting
results with and without four outlier cities that have exceptionally high levels of exposure to export
growth, Dongguan, Shenzen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai. The ﬁrst two are cities in Guangdong Province,
which lie immediately to the north of Hong Kong; the third is a city that borders Shanghai; and the
fourth is a city that borders Macao. Hence, the outliers in terms of export growth are cities that
have access to major international ports and that were among the earliest locations in which special
economic zones were established (Yu and Tian, 2012).
Bartik Predicted Export Growth
Our ﬁrst shock to export growth is a Bartik (1991) type measure, a variant of shift-share growth
decomposition which is commonly applied in labor economics (e.g., Diamond, 2016) to capture how
national-level shocks are transmitted to local economies. We project national export growth onto
Chinese regions by multiplying industry export growth in outside regions (i.e., excluding a given
city i) by the initial share of an industry in city i's exports and then summing across industries in
the city. The resulting Bartik measure is:
∆bit =
∑
j
Xijt−1
Xit−1
(
X−ijt −X−ijt−1
X−ijt−1
) Xi0
Pi0
, (2)
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of industry j in city i's exports in the initial period, which captures
regional comparative advantage in the industry, and X−ijt is national exports in industry j and year
t excluding the province in which city i is located.
The logic behind the expression in equation (2) as a determinant of export growth is that the
initial pattern of export specialization in a city exposes the city to national-level shocks more in
some industries than in others. There is a clear theoretical logic behind using initial city industry
export shares to characterize the exposure of a city to national export growth opportunities. Taking
a trade model with a gravity structure, one can easily show that regional or national exposure to
global industry shocks (due, e.g., to trade reform or technological change at home or abroad) is
summarized by the initial pattern of regional or national specialization by industry (Autor, Dorn,
and Hanson, 2013 and 2016). Indeed, in the exact hat algebra of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008)
for general-equilibrium trade models, these initial industry shares of activity in an economy fully
summarize initial patterns of comparative advantage. As mentioned in section 1, our approach to
measuring regional exposure to export growth opportunities does not require us to take a stand
as to whether specialization patterns reﬂect comparative advantage, agglomeration economies, or
their interaction. All that is required is that initial patterns of regional specialization are useful for
predicting regional export growth, which we show empirically to be the case.
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To avoid introducing a common source of measurement error on both sides of the regression
equation, we measure the scaling variable in (2), Xi0/Pi0, using values from a pre-sample year
(1997 in our analysis, which is the ﬁrst year for which we have regional trade data). We deﬁne the
population level for the pre-sample period in a region as the geometric mean of population levels in
1990 and 2000, given that population measures are only available in census years (e.g., 1990, 2000,
2010). In (2), we deﬁne industries at the HS 2-digit product level, in order to limit the distorting
eﬀects of zero values on measuring initial regional comparative advantage. Whereas in 2000 zero
values populate 89% of city-HS-6-digit-product combinations and 81% of city-HS-4-digit-product
combinations, zero export values account for just 54% of the city-HS-2-digit-product combinations.
To give an initial view of the data, Figures 1a and 1b plot the Bartik variable in equation
(2) against export growth per capita in equation (1). In Figure 1a, we see both a strong positive
correlation between the two variables (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.61) and the presence of the four
outlier cities in terms of export growth; in Figure 1b, we see that the correlation between Bartik-
predicted and observed export growth remains strongly positive (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.86)
when the four outlier cities are dropped from the sample. We will report regression results with and
without controls for the four outlier cities in the analysis.
Industry Tariﬀs
We include in the analysis measures of regional exposure to changes in output tariﬀs and to changes
in input tariﬀs. To utilize the tariﬀ data, we need to account for the fact that tariﬀ measures for a
given year are deﬁned in terms of the HS product codes which apply to that year. The tariﬀ data
for 2000 are based on the 1996 HS codes, whereas the tariﬀ data for 2010 are based on 2007 HS
codes. To create a common basis for measurement, we ﬁrst take the simple average of tariﬀs across
HS 8-digit products within an HS 6-digit product in each year and then use the WITS crosswalk to
convert the 2000 tariﬀs to the 1996 HS codes. Using as weights the share of each HS 6-digit product
within China's HS 2-digit exports in 2000, we calculate the average HS 2-digit tariﬀs in 2000 and
2010, respectively. With these tariﬀs in hand, we then calculate the average change in output tariﬀs
that apply to city i as:
∆τOit =
∑
j
Xijt−1
Xit−1
[ln (1 + τjt)− ln (1 + τjt−1)] , (3)
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of HS 2-digit product j in city i's exports in the initial period and
τjt is the tariﬀ that applies to HS 2-digit product j in year t.
To calculate changes in tariﬀs that apply to intermediate inputs, we use the 2002 input/output
table for China, which is deﬁned for IO 5-digit sectors (of which there are 122) at the national level.1
The construction of the input tariﬀ proceeds in three steps. First, we convert HS 6-digit-product
1At the provincial level, I/O tables are calculated at the IO 2-digit level (42 industries). Because these data use
more aggregate industry categories (and may be subject to measurement error in smaller provinces), we elect to use
national I/O tables.
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tariﬀs to 5-digit IO sectors. Second, we calculate the change in input tariﬀs for IO sector j in city i
as:
∆τ Iijt =
∑
j′
γjj′
[
ln
(
1 + τij′t
)− ln (1 + τij′t−1)] , (4)
where γjj′ is the share of inputs from IO sector j
′ in total input purchases by IO sector j. Third,
we calculate the average change in input tariﬀs for city i by combining industry changes in input
tariﬀs ∆τ Iijt with initial city importing patterns. The resulting value is,
∆τ Iit =
∑
j′
Mijt−1
Mit−1
∆τ Iijt, (5)
where Mijt−1/Mit−1 is the share of IO industry j in total imports by city i in the initial period.
Because we cannot separate a city's imports in an industry into those used for intermediate inputs
versus those used in ﬁnal consumption, we impose the assumption that input and consumption
shares for imports are the same within each industry and within each city.
In Figures 2a and 2b, we plot regional exposure to changes in output and input tariﬀs in equa-
tions (3) and (5) against regional weighted average initial tariﬀs. The strong, linear, and negative
relationships between initial tariﬀs and tariﬀ changes indicate that the magnitude of tariﬀ reductions
were driven largely by the level of China's pre-WTO tariﬀ protection. As part of China's WTO ac-
cession, the country reduced both the mean and variance of tariﬀs, such that initially more-protected
industries saw larger increases in foreign competition and in access to foreign inputs. After 2001, the
regions in which these industries were concentrated thus also saw larger increases in import com-
petition and imported-input access. This pattern of tariﬀ change derives largely from the fact that
the WTO mandates maximum levels for tariﬀs at the industry level. Initially high-tariﬀ industries
were thus mechanically subject to larger reductions in tariﬀs, as China brought its trade barriers in
line with WTO guidelines.
In Figures 3a and 3b, we plot regional export growth against regional exposure to changes in
input tariﬀs, ﬁrst including all observations (in Figure 3a) and then dropping the four outliers cities.
There is an apparent negative correlation between regional export growth and exposure to input tariﬀ
changes, indicating that cities enjoying fast increases in exports per capita were those specialized in
industries that saw larger reductions in tariﬀs on imported inputs. The slope of the regression line
falls sharply in absolute value when outlier cities for export growth are dropped.
NTR Gap (Pierce and Schott tariﬀ uncertainty measure)
Pierce and Schott (2016) measure uncertainty in trade policy confronting China before its accession
to the WTO using the diﬀerence in U.S. non-MFN and MFN tariﬀswhich they refer to as the
normal trade relations (NTR) tariﬀ gap. This gap represents the increase in tariﬀs that would have
occurred had U.S. Congress not reauthorized China's MFN status in the U.S. market. While China
was granted MFN status in the United States in 1980, Congress instituted a requirement for annual
11
reauthorization after the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Once China became a WTO member
in 2001, it was no longer subject to this annual reauthorization risk. U.S. non-MFN tariﬀs have
changed only modestly since the 1930s. We take the simple average of HS 8-digit NTR and non-NTR
tariﬀs within HS 6-digit products for the year 1999. We then calculate the average NTR gap among
the HS-6-digit products that are contained in a HS 2-digit code, using as weights the share of an HS
6-digit product in China's HS 2-digit exports to the United States. Finally, we calculate the regional
NTR gap by combining NTR gaps at the HS 2-digit level with the initial composition of a region's
exports across HS 2-digit products, yielding the following measure:
NTRi =
∑
j
Xijt−1
Xit−1
∑
k∈j
γjkt−1
(
τnon−NTRk,1999 − τNTRk,1999
) , (6)
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of HS 2-digit product j in city i's exports in the initial period, γjk is
the share of HS 6-digit product k in China's exports of HS 2-digit product j to the United States in
the initial period, and τnon−NTRk,1999 (τ
NTR
k,1999) is the U.S. non-NTR (NTR) tariﬀ for HS 6-digit product k
in 1999. The average NTR gap has a mean value of 32% (standard deviation of 13%) across Chinese
regions (see Table 3).
MFA Quotas
To capture the exposure of regions to the removal of MFA quotas, we calculate the export share
of products subject to MFA quotas within each HS 2-digit product in the year 2000, where we
account for the fact that some HS 8-digit products may be subject to a quota in one market (e.g.,
the United States) but not in other markets (e.g., Canada). The resulting measure of exposure to
the elimination of MFA quotas for city i is, in 2000:
MFAi =
∑
j
Xijt−1
Xit−1
MFAj2000, (7)
where MFAj2000 is the share of exports in HS 2-digit product j subject to MFA quotas in the year
2000. The average value for this share is 2%, with a maximum value of 12% (Table 3).
4 Empirical Results
The speciﬁcation for regional export growth that we estimate is the following:
∆xit = αs + β1∆bit + β2∆τ
O
it + β3∆τ
I
it + β4NTRi + β5MFAi + it, (8)
where ∆xit is growth in exports per capita for city i from (1), αs is a dummy variable for the province
in which city i is located, ∆bit is the Bartik predictor of regional export growth in (2), ∆τ
O
it is the
exposure of city i to changes in output tariﬀs in (3), ∆τ Iit is the exposure of city i to changes in input
tariﬀs in (5), NTRi is the average NTR gap confronting city i as of 1999 in (6),MFAi is the average
12
share of exports by city i subject to MFA quotas as of 2000 in (7), and it is an error term. ∆τ
O
it
(∆τ Iit) is replaced as zero for cities with no export (import) in 2000. Accordingly, a dummy variable
for the 18 cities with no import or export in 2000 is included. The time period for the analysis is 2000
to 2010, meaning that we estimate a single long diﬀerence for 337 cities, which are approximately at
the prefectural level. The province-managing counties (accounting for 1% of China's population in
2000) which the provincial government could by-pass the prefecture government to control directly
are merged into prefectures which used to govern the counties. Standard errors are clustered at the
province level (of which there are 31 and which include 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities).
4.1 Results for the Bartik Predictor and Industry Tariﬀs
Table 4 presents our main estimation results. Panel (A) shows baseline regressions that do not
include any covariates other than an indicator variable for the small number of cities that lack
foreign trade in the base year. The column (1) estimate indicates that the shift-share instrument
is a strong and precise predictor of local export growth (t-statistic of 7.3). The large R-squared
value of 0.63 indicates that patterns of local export growth largely reﬂect national industry trends
in exporting, rather than city-speciﬁc shocks.
In column (2), we replace the shift-share variable with regional exposure to the change in output
tariﬀs. The negative coeﬃcient indicates that regions whose industries have been subject to larger
reductions in output tariﬀs had more rapid export growth, a ﬁnding that we will see is not robust.
A negative coeﬃcient also appears on regional exposure to changes in input tariﬀs, in column (3).
When we include both input and output tariﬀ exposure together in the regression, in column (4),
a similar result obtains. Exposure to output-tariﬀ changes enters negatively, indicating that cities
exposed to larger increases in foreign competition have greater export growth. Exposure to input-
tariﬀ changes also enters negatively, indicating that cities enjoying greater improvements in access
to imported inputs experience faster export growth. The coeﬃcients are precisely estimated and
quantitatively sizable.
The ﬁnding on input tariﬀs is consistent with substantial evidence that reductions in barriers
to foreign inputs raise industry productivity and output (e.g., Yu, 2015; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck,
Wang, and Zhang, 2017). Comparing cities at the 25th and 75th percentiles of exposure to output-
tariﬀ reductions, the latter has greater export growth by 483 US dollars per person ((.08− .05)×16.1
units of 1,000 dollars per capita), or 0.2 standard deviations; comparing cities at the 25th and 75th
percentiles of exposure to input-tariﬀ reductions, the latter has export growth that is greater by
904 dollars per person ((.04 − .02) × 45.2 × 1000), or 0.3 standard deviations. These impacts fall
substantially, however, when further controls are added to the regression.
In columns (5) to (7) of Table 4 (panel A), we add the Bartik predictor of city export growth to
the speciﬁcations with tariﬀ variables. The result is a substantial increase in the explanatory power
of the regression, with the adjusted R-squared rising from 0.10 in column (4)  with just output
and input tariﬀs as regressors  to 0.64 in column (7)  with the Bartik measure added to the
speciﬁcation. Using the column (7) results, moving a city from the 25th to the 75th percentile of
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exposure to national-industry export growth leads to higher export growth of 238 dollars per person
((.43− .02)×0.58×1000), or 0.08 standard deviations. Further, the inclusion of the Bartik predictor
leads to a substantial reduction in the estimated impacts of output-tariﬀ or input-tariﬀ changes on
regional export growth. Adding the Bartik variable causes the coeﬃcients on both tariﬀ variables
to fall by nearly three ﬁfths (when comparing column 7 to column 4), though both variables remain
at least marginally statistically signiﬁcant.
Panel (B) of Table 4 repeats the regressions in panel (A), now with province dummies added
to the speciﬁcation. Comparing column (1) in panels (A) and (B), we ﬁnd no impact of these
geographic controls on the coeﬃcient estimate for predicted export growth, while the precision of
the estimate improves. Columns (2)-(4) in panels (A) and (B) however show that the inclusion
of province dummies leads the absolute magnitude of the coeﬃcients on output-tariﬀ changes to
fall by about three-quarters and input-tariﬀ changes to fall by half. The sensitivity of exposure
to tariﬀ changes to the inclusion of provincial dummies suggests that these measures could be
correlated with unobserved regional shocks  e.g., regarding the establishment of SEZs, openness
to internal migration, or the phaseout of state-owned enterprises. When we further add the Bartik
predictor of regional export growth, the tariﬀ coeﬃcients fall further. In column (7), the panel
(B) coeﬃcient on output tariﬀs is only two-ﬁfths as large and the coeﬃcient on input tariﬀs is
only one-quarter as large, when compared to the coeﬃcients in panel (A); with province dummies
included, the ﬁrst variable is insigniﬁcant while the second is marginally signiﬁcant. By contrast,
the coeﬃcient on the Bartik predictor remains strongly positive and precisely estimated, increasing
slightly in absolute value when provincial controls are added to the regression. The stability of
the coeﬃcient on Bartik-predicted exports to the inclusion of provincial dummy variables indicates
that this variable captures robust explanatory factors behind regional export growth, including the
exposure of regions to comparative-advantage or industry-agglomeration driven export expansions
associated with China's phase of post-reform transitional growth.
In panel (C) of Table 4 we further add dummies for the four outlier cities seen in Figure 1a.
The absolute coeﬃcient magnitudes on output tariﬀs and input tariﬀs decline further, while for the
Bartik variable they increase modestly. Considering the results in column (7), output and input
tariﬀ coeﬃcients fail to achieve statistical signiﬁcance. Comparing cities at the 25th versus 75th
percentiles of exposure to output-tariﬀ reductions, the latter would have export growth that is 0.01
standard deviations higher, while comparing cities at the 25th versus 75th percentiles of exposure
to input-tarriﬀ reductions, the latter would also have export growth that is 0.02 standard deviations
higher. The Bartik variable continues to be strongly positive and precisely estimated. Comparing
cities at the 25th versus 75th percentiles of exposure to national-industry export growth, the latter
would have export growth that is 0.10 standard deviations higher.
The shift-share variable and the tariﬀ variables are all functions of a city's export composition
across industries in the base year 2000. It is therefore possible that any of these variables could be
correlated with unobserved sectoral shock such as diﬀerent technology trends. Panel (D) of Table
4 augments the baseline model of panel (A) with two control variables for the share of textile and
14
apparel, and the share of electronics and machinery in a city's exports in 2000. In 1997, both of
these sectors accounted for over a quarter of all Chinese exports (29% textile and apparel, 27%
electronics and machinery). By 2010, the fraction of textile and apparel had declined to 15%, while
exports of electronics and machinery had expanded to 50% of all exports. The results in column (1)
of panel (D) indicate that the inclusion of these controls modestly reduces the coeﬃcient estimate
for predicted export growth compared to the baseline model in panel (A) while precision improves.
All coeﬃcient estimates for the tariﬀ variables in the subsequent columns of panel (D) are much
smaller than the initial estimates in panel (A), and none reaches a high level of signﬁcance.
The ﬁnal panel (E) of Table (4) includes both the geographic controls from panel (C) and the
two controls for sectorial composition from panel (D). The estimate for the Bartik variable retains
a similar magnitude as in the previous speciﬁcations, and it remains highly signiﬁcant. By contrast,
estimates for the tariﬀ variables are modest in magnitude and never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
irrespective of the exclusion or inclusion of the Bartik variable in the regression model (columns 2-4
vs columns 5-7).
There are three primary lessons from these results. First is that for explaining regional ex-
port growth in China, the variation in regional exposure to output- and input-tariﬀ changes that
is independent from regional exposure to national-industry export growth is modest. The Bartik
predictor functionally operates as an omnibus measure of the sources of export growth in China,
implicitly capturing a substantial portion of the trade-policy shocks associated with explicit output-
and input-tariﬀ changes. Second, and related, is that because the magnitude of tariﬀ reductions in
China was largely determined by the level of initial tariﬀs (Figures 2a, 2b) it appears to be the strong
comparative-advantage industries  i.e., industries that following the phaseout of Maoist-era distor-
tions were most primed for export growth  that were initially the most protected. Thus, when we
add the Bartik predictor to the regression, the impact of output- and input-tariﬀ changes is dimin-
ished, while the explanatory power of the regressions improves sharply. The increase in explanatory
power suggests that there are non-tariﬀ policy distortions that kept China's comparative-advantage
industries artiﬁcially small in the pre-reform period, such that their removal helped unleash a surge
in growth in the regions in which these industries were concentrated. Evidently, regional exposure
to the removal of these other distortions is far from fully encapsulated by regional exposure to in-
dustry tariﬀ changes. Third, the Bartik predictor yields stable results across regression models that
do or do not control for province dummies, outlier cities and initial sectorial composition. This
pattern indicates that the shift-share variable is able to predict variation in export growth across
cities within the same province, and across cities that had a similar pattern of specialization across
broad industrial sectors. The variation in export growth that is related to the tariﬀ variables instead
gets largely absorbed by a parsimonious set of geography and sector controls, which implies that it
is diﬃcult to separate the impact of tariﬀs from other shocks that operate at the level of provinces
or broad sectors.
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4.2 Results on the NTR Gap and MFA Quotas
In Table 5, we expand the analysis to include the NTR gap, which is the Pierce and Schott (2016)
measure of pre-WTO tariﬀ uncertainty confronting China in the U.S. market. Accordingly, we use
regional growth in exports to the United States instead of regional export growth to construct the
dependent variable in equation (1) for Table 5. The Bartik predicted export growth is constructed in
a similar way by using predicted export growth to the United States. The NTR gap enters positively
and is precisely estimated in column (1) of panel (A), a speciﬁcation with no other controls in the
regression. This ﬁnding indicates that regions more specialized in industries subject to greater
uncertainty over U.S. trade policy in the 1990s enjoyed faster export growth in the 2000s, once
China had joined the WTO. However, the coeﬃcient on the NTR gap falls substantially and loses
signiﬁcance in column (3), with the Bartik predictor and output and input tariﬀs added to the
speciﬁcation.
For completeness, we also examine results using an alternative measure of trade policy uncer-
tainty. Columns (4) to (6) of panel (A) of Table 5 use the Handley and Limao (2017) measure of
pre-WTO U.S. trade policy uncertainty for China. We see a similar pattern for coeﬃcient estimates
on this variable as for the NTR gap, with a large, positive and precisely estimated eﬀect with no
other controls in the regression (column 4), which falls to near zero when additional controls are
included (column 6). With either measure of trade-policy uncertainty included in the regression,
coeﬃcient estimates on tariﬀ variables have similar values and patterns of statistical signiﬁcance as
in Table 4.
We obtain considerably smaller coeﬃcient estimates on the NTR gap and the Handley and Limao
(2017) trade-policy uncertainty measure in panel (B) of Table 5, which reports speciﬁcations that
incorporate dummy variables for provinces and four outlier cities. It is now the case that both
trade-policy uncertainty measures are highly insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, no matter whether or
not the Bartik and tariﬀ variables appear in the regression. In columns (3) and (6), the NTR gap
and the Handley-Limao measure have t-statistics of 0.38 and 0.30, respectively. It thus appears that
regional exposure to uncertainty over U.S. trade policy can only predict spatial variation in export
growth to the United States across Chinese provinces, but not across cities within provinces.
The regression models in panel (C) of Table 5 omit the province and outlier city dummies, but
control for initial export shares of the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery sectors. These
controls for broad sectorial composition of export activity reduce the panel (A) estimates for NTR
gap and trade policy uncertainty by more than half in most models, suggest that tariﬀ uncertainly
varies primarily across rather than within broad sectors. Taken together, the panel (B) and (C)
results imply that it is diﬃcult to separate eﬀects of tariﬀ uncertainty from province-level and
sector-level shocks.
Table 6 expands the analysis to include regional exposure to the elimination of MFA quotas.
We report results with and without provincial dummy variables, control for the four outlier cities
(which accounted for a large fraction of China's apparel and tariﬀ production in its pre-WTO era),
and control for the initial export shares of the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery sectors. In
16
no speciﬁcation is the coeﬃcient on MFA quotas precisely estimated. There is little change in the
results when the Bartik predictor, tariﬀ variables and the NTR gap are added to the speciﬁcation
(columns 4-6). We conclude that there is little evidence regional exposure to the elimination of MFA
quotas aﬀected regional export growth in China during the 2000s.
4.3 Results on Exports by Trade Regime and Firm Ownership Type
In Table 7, we expand the analysis by disaggregating exports by customs trade regime. Column
(1) replicates results from column (7) and panel C of Table 4. Column (2) uses processing exports
alone (rather than total exports) to construct the dependent variable in equation (1), while column
(3) uses ordinary exports in the equivalent variable construction. Bartik predicted export growth is
based on all trade. We see qualitatively similar results to those in Table 4. Overall Bartik-predicted
export growth is strongly positive correlated with regime-speciﬁc export growth, both under the
ordinary trade regime and the export-processing regime. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the analysis,
now using regime-speciﬁc trade to construct Bartik-predicted export growth, with broadly similarly
results. Finally, in column (6) we return to total export growth as the dependent variable and include
regime-speciﬁc Bartik-predicted exports. With both Bartik variables in the regression, we see that
predicted growth in processing exports is the stronger variable of the two, with a coeﬃcient of 1.11 for
Bartik-predicted processing exports compared to 0.33 for Bartik-predicted ordinary exports, where
the former is very precisely estimated while the latter fails to achieve statistical signiﬁcance.
Finally, we turn to exports by ﬁrm ownership type in Table 8. We perform an analysis similar to
that in Table 7, in which we analyze export growth separately for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in
columns (1) and (4), private domestic enterprises (POEs) in columns (2) and (5), and foreign-owned
enterprises (FOEs) in columns (3) and (6). In columns (1)-(3), we see that overall Bartik-predicted
export growth is strongly positively correlated with export growth of each ownership type; in columns
(4)-(6) we see that Bartik-predicted export growth for each ownership type is strongly positively
correlated with export growth of that type (i.e., predicted SOE export growth has a strong positive
impact on actual SOE export growth, etc.). In column (7), we combine the three Bartik-predicted
export growth measures together to explain total city export growth. Strikingly, while Bartik-
predicted export growth for foreign-owned enterprises has a positive and precisely estimated impact
on overall export growth, predicted export growth for SOEs and POEs enter insigniﬁcantly, and
the latter with a negative sign. Of the components of predicted city export growth that matter for
overall export expansion, it is growth related to foreign-owned ﬁrms that appears to be the most
important, both economically and statistically.
Why might the shift-share analysis show that the local presence of foreign-owned enterprises
 and their associated national growth  is the strongest predictor of regional export booms
among the three ownership types? One possibility is that foreign-owned ﬁrms may be a channel
through which local ﬁrms learn about foreign market opportunities. That is, export production by
foreign ﬁrms may generate positive spillovers to nearby ﬁrms by showing them the types of goods
to produce (helping spread product innovations), how to manufacture them (helping spread process
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innovations), and where to sell them (helping spread marketing knowledge). Another possibility is
that local governments successful in attracting foreign ﬁrms may oﬀer a policy environment that is
conducive to trade growth for all ﬁrm types. Such policies could include the more eﬃcient operation
of customs, relatively low regulatory burdens, and greater ease of resolving commercial disputes.
A third possibility is that Deng's experiments in creating SEZs had long-lasting eﬀects. Initially,
foreign-owned ﬁrms were conﬁned to operate in SEZs, which were concentrated in a few select
locations in the country. Over time, SEZs proliferated and private ﬁrms, both foreign and domestic,
were permitted to produce for export in many locations. The early establishment of SEZs may have
shaped later local industrial development, and perhaps policy-makers attitudes toward foreign trade,
in a manner that had persistent eﬀects on regional export activity.
5 Discussion
Over the last quarter century, China has experienced one of the greatest manufacturing booms
that the world has ever seen. The country's dramatic expansion in the supply of exports and in
the demand for imported inputs have upended markets globally. The China export-supply shock
has contributed to reductions in manufacturing employment in regions specialized in labor-intensive
manufacturing in Germany, Mexico, Norway, Spain and the United States, among other countries
(Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016). In turn, the China import-demand shock contributed to spikes
in global commodity prices in the mid to late 2000s, with concomitant sharp increases in export
earnings in commodity exporting economies. Although the China shock appears to have peaked
in the late 2000s, the two-decade-long period of growth in the country's manufacturing sector has
enduringly transformed the global economy.
Driving China's export growth is the country's greater openness to foreign trade and investment.
Although there is a long list of potential factors that are responsible for China's export surge, most
literature to date has focused on one or another factor, without considering them in concert. Our goal
in this paper is to evaluate the contributions of exposure to changes in output tariﬀs, input tariﬀs,
uncertainty over trade policy, and MFA apparel and textile quotas to regional export growth in
China. We compare the role of these speciﬁc measures of policy change to a Bartik predictor, which
captures diﬀerential regional exposure to export growth tied to China's underlying comparative
advantage. That is, while industry-speciﬁc changes in trade policy surely matter for explaining
China's recent trade expansion, what has also driven manufacturing export growth is the country's
once-in-an-epoch transition from near economic isolation to a high degree of openness. During this
process of transitional growth, regions more specialized in strong comparative-advantage industries
(or strong agglomeration-economy industries) would have experienced larger increases in production,
as China reoriented from production for its domestic market to production for the global economy
and moved from a distorted equilibrium far inside its technology frontier to an equilibrium more
closely aligned with world relative prices for goods and services.
Our ﬁndings indicate that a simple Bartik measure is the strongest and most robust predictor of
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China's regional export growth among those examined. It consistently explains a larger share of the
spatial variation in export growth than any of the tariﬀ-based variables, and remains a signiﬁcant
predictor of export growth also in regressions that allow for diﬀerent time trends across provinces and
broad sectors. With other controls in the regression, changes in output tariﬀs and input tariﬀs, trade-
policy uncertainty and MFA quota elimination instead appear to be only weakly related to China's
regional export growth. These results imply that regional variation in Chinese export growth, and
particular spatial variation within provinces, has important determinants beyond tariﬀ policy which
are captured by the Bartik measure.
Looking forward, one would expect that the contribution of China's initial comparative advantage
for its regional export growth may attenuate. As China's period of post-transition growth comes
to an end, the country appears to be engaging in more concerted industrial policy, as indicated
by intensifying government eﬀorts to move the country into the production of high-end electronics,
renewable energy technologies, and sophisticated transportation equipment. Similarly, the eﬀects of
changes in speciﬁc trade policies may also recede in importance for China's regional export growth.
Reductions in import barriers were most intense in the half-decade immediately after China's WTO
accession. These impacts will likely lessen in importance as the country moves further away from its
entry date. If, indeed, industrial policy increasingly supplants the role of China's market transition
in guiding the expansion of its export activity, other factors may rise in importance in explaining
the regional distribution of export production. These factors may include the ability of regional
government oﬃcials to steer industrial policies in favor of their local industries and ﬁrms.
19
References
Acemoglu, Daron, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan Price. 2016.
"Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s," Journal of Labor Economics,
34 (S1): S141S198.
Amiti, Mary, Mi Dai, Robert C. Feenstra, and John Romalis. 2017. "How did China's WTO
Entry Beneﬁt US Consumers?" NBER Working Paper No. 23487.
Amiti, Mary and Jozef Konings. 2007. "Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Produc-
tivity: Evidence from Indonesia." American Economic Review. 97(5): 1611-1638.
Alder, Simon, Lin Shao, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2016. "Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy
in a Panel of Chinese Cities." Journal of Economic Growth, 21(4): 305-349.
Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. "The China Syndrome: Local
Labor Market Eﬀects of Import Competition in the United States." American Economic Review,
103(6): 2121-2168.
Autor, David H., David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Jae Song. 2014. "Trade Adjustment:
Worker Level Evidence." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4): 1799860.
Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2016. "The China Shock: Learning from
Labor-market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade." Annual Review of Economics. 8: 205-240.
Bai, Chong-En, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Zheng Michael Song. 2016. "Crony Capitalism with
Chinese Characteristics." University of Chicago, Working Paper
Bai, Xue, Kala Krishna, and Hong Ma. 2017. "How You Export Matters: Export Mode,
Learning and Productivity in China." Journal of International Economics, 104: 122-137.
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. "Who Beneﬁts from State and Local Economic Development Policies?"
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research: Kalamazoo, MI.
Berkowitz, Daniel, Hong Ma, and Shuichiro Nishioka. 2017. "Recasting the Iron Rice Bowl: The
Reform of China's State Owned Enterprises." Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming..
Bombardini, Matilde, and Bingjing Li. 2016. "Trade, Pollution and Mortality in China". NBER
Working Paper No. 22804.
Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Yifan Zhang. 2012. "Creative Accounting or
Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing." Journal of
Development Economics, 97(2): 339-351.
Brandt, Loren, and Peter Morrow. 2017. "Tariﬀs and the Organization of Trade in China."
Journal of International Economics, 104: 85-103.
Brandt, Loren, Debin Ma, and Thomas Rawski. 2016. "Industrialization in China." IZA Dis-
cussion Papers 10096, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Brandt, Loren, Luhang Wang, and Yifan Zhang. 2017. "Productivity in Chinese Industry:
1998-2013." Working Paper.
Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Luhang Wang, and Yifan Zhang. 2017. "WTO Acces-
sion and Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Firms." American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Cheng, Wenya, and Andrei Potlogea. 2015. "Trade Liberalization and Economic Development:
Evidence from China's WTO Accession." Working Paper.
Dai, Mi, Madhura Maitra, and Miaojie Yu. 2016. "Unexceptional Exporter Performance in
China? The Role of Processing Trade." Journal of Development Economics. (121): 177-189.
Dekle, Robert, Jonathan Eaton, and Samuel Kortum. 2008. "Global Rebalancing with Gravity:
Measuring the Burden of Adjustment." IMF Economic Review, 55: 511-540.
Diamond, Rebecca. 2016. "The Determinants and Welfare Implications of US Workers' Diverg-
ing Location Choices by Skill: 1980-2000." American Economic Review, 106(3): 479-524.
20
Ding, Sai, Puyang Sun, and Wei Jiang. 2015. "The Eﬀect of Foreign Entry Regulation on
Downstream Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence from China." Working Paper.
Erten, Bilge and Jessica Leight. 2017. "Exporting out of Agriculture: The Impact of WTO
Accession on Structural Transformation in China" Working Paper.
Fan, Jingting, 2015. "Internal Geography, Labor Mobility, and the Distributional Impacts of
Trade." Working Paper.
Feng, Ling, Zhiyuan Li, and Deborah L. Swenson. 2017. "Trade Policy Uncertainty and Exports:
Evidence from China's WTO Accession." Journal of International Economics. 106: 20-36.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 2005. "Ownership and Control in Outsourcing
to China: Estimating the Property-rights Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics.
120(2): 729-761.
Goldberg, Pinelopi, Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik, Petia Topalova. 2010. "Imported Interme-
diate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from India." Quarterly Journal of Economics.
125(4): 1727-1767.
Handley, Kyle, and Nuno Limao. 2017. "Policy Uncertainty, Trade and Welfare: Theory and
Evidence for China and the U.S.". American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Ralph Ossa. 2016. "A Global View of Productivity Growth in China."
Journal of International Economics. (102): 209-224.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Zheng Song. 2015. "Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Trans-
formation of the State Sector in China." NBER Working Paper No. 21006.
Khandelwal, Amit K., Peter K. Schott, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2013. "Trade Liberalization and
Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from Chinese Exporters." American Economic Review.
103(6): 2169-2195.
Li, Hongbin, Lei Li, Binzhen Wu, and Yanyan Xiong. 2012. "The End of Cheap Chinese Labor."
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(4): 57-74.
Leight, Jessica. 2016. "Complementarity between Non-agricultural and Agricultural Shocks in
Rural Industrialization: Evidence from China." Working Paper.
Li, Bingjing. 2015. "Export Expansion, Skill Acquisition and Industry Specialization: Evidence
from China." Working Paper.
Naughton, Barry. 1996. "Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993."
Cambridge university press.
Naughton, Barry. 2007. "The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth." Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Pierce, Justin R, and Peter K Schott. 2016. "The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. Manufac-
turing Employment." American Economic Review. 106(7): 1632-1662.
Rodrik, Dani. 2006. "What's So Special about China's Exports?" China and World Economy.
14(5): 1-19.
Song, Zheng, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2011. "Growing Like China." American
Economic Review, 101(1): 196-233.
Topalova, Petia, and Amit Khandelwal. 2011. "Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity:
The Case of India." Review of Economics and Statistics. 93(3): 995-1009.
Vogel, Ezra F. 2011. "Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China." Vol. 10. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Wang, Jin. 2013. "The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese
Municipalities." Journal of Development Economics. 101: 133-147.
Xu, Bin, and Jiangyong, Lu. 2009. "Foreign Direct Investment, Processing Trade, and the
Sophistication of China's Exports." China Economic Review, 20(3): 425-439.
21
Yu, Miaojie. 2015. "Processing Trade, Tariﬀ Reductions, and Firm Productivity: Evidence from
Chinese Firms," Economic Journal. 125(585): 943-88.
Yu, Miaojie, and Wei Tan. 2012. "China's Processing Trade: A Firm-Level Analysis," in Huw
McMay and Ligang Song (eds.) Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China, Australian National
University E-press: 111-148.
Yu, Miaojie, and Wei Tan. 2017. "Processing Trade, Export Intensity, and Input Trade Liber-
alization: Evidence from Chinese Firms." Journal of Asia-Paciﬁc Economy, forthcoming.
Zhu, Xiaodong. 2012. "Understanding China's Growth: Past, Present, and Future." Journal of
Economic Perspectives. 26(4): 103-124.
Zi, Yuan. 2016. "Trade Liberalization and the Great Labor Reallocation", Working Paper.
22
